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Abstract 
In this paper, I will explain how ancient Greek philosophy can be made relevant to our lives. I do 
this by explaining how an instructor of a course in ancient Greek philosophy can teach Greek 
philosophy in a way that makes its study relevant to how the students in the course live their lives. 
Since this is the most likely way in which its relevance to contemporary life might be realized in 
practice, I explain its relevance from this perspective. I contrast the different ways in which ancient 
Greek philosophy is taught, and give examples of how it can be taught that calls attention to the 
ways in which what the Greeks said are relevant to how students live their lives. 
 
 
In this paper, I will explain how ancient Greek philosophy can be made 
relevant to contemporary life. The form in which I will explain this is by 
discussing how an instructor of a course in ancient Greek philosophy can teach 
Greek philosophy in a way that makes its study relevant to how the students in 
the course live their lives, since this is the most likely way in which its relevance 
to contemporary life might be realized in practice.   
One of the ways in which many instructors of courses in ancient Greek 
philosophy attempt to make its study relevant to the interests of their students is 
to teach the course from the perspective of contemporary analytic philosophy.
1 
This way to teach the course makes it relevant to students who have a 
background in contemporary analytic philosophy or wish to pursue a career as a 
professional philosopher or to seek a historical background to contemporary 
philosophy.
2  A more traditional way to make the course relevant is to teach it as 
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1 A good example of this approach is how most instructors discuss Plato’s Sophist in terms of 
questions about existential, predicative, or identity senses of “is” and “is not,” when in fact Plato does 
not draw such distinctions. For a detailed account of the misleading character of his approach see my 
Plato’s Sophist: A Translation with a Detailed Account of its Theses and Arguments (New York: Peter 
Lang Publishing, 2005). 
2 Many courses in ancient Greek philosophy taught in research institutions are so closely tied to the 
secondary literature on the subject that they have little relevance to, or interest for, their students who 
have no plans to pursue an academic career in philosophy. Such courses tend to become training 
grounds for specialists in ancient Greek philosophy. In fact, most courses in philosophy taught in   2
a course in which students are introduced to the theories and arguments of the 
Greek philosophers that have historical importance. This way of teaching the 
course is relevant to students interested in the history of philosophy as history, 
including students of ancient and medieval history. I wish to suggest here a 
radically different alternative to these two, one that provides students with an 
opportunity to assimilate into their lives the genuine insights of the Greeks about 
fundamental philosophical questions about life rather than simply to prepare 
them for an academic career or give them information about the history of 
Western philosophy. The study of ancient Greek philosophy, from this third 
point of view, is a study primarily conducted for the sake of helping students to 
gain the wisdom that makes meaningful life possible.
3 This approach to 
teaching the course is also relevant to the goal of changing the society in which 
students live, since significant change in society is likely to occur when its youth 
is provided with a truly liberating (aka liberal) education of the sort envisioned 
by Plato’s Socrates. This is a course in which students are taught Greek 
philosophy in a way that inspires them to ask themselves the fundamental 
philosophical questions of the sort the Greeks asked themselves and to study the 
different ways in which the Greeks used reason to answer these questions to help 
them formulate their own answers.   
The instructor facilitates this process by introducing students, in the very 
first class period, to the idea of using their study to create an “inner 
philosopher,” a philosophical mind, which like Socrates, is devoted to 
self-examination for the purpose of discovering a form of life that makes life 
worth living.
4 The instructor introduces the traditional contrast between mythos 
and logos, but not only as a way to explain the emergence of rational inquiry in 
the ancient world. The instructor also explains to students what the mythos is in 
their own case: the conventional story they were told about themselves and their 
world and accepted before they were capable of using the logos or rational 
discourse to examine and evaluate it. This mythos is the unexamined life, a life 
in which only a semblance of freedom from constraint can be attained, since true 
                                                                                                                                                                      
research institutions are in effect taught for the sake of training specialists in different areas of 
philosophy. The reasons for this development are the subject of another paper. 
3 Students, of course, are not evaluated on this basis, but on the basis of their mastery of the theories 
and arguments presented by the Greeks. 
4 This approach is based on the idea of Jungian archetypes. The inner philosopher, as an archetype, 
confronts the inner king, queen, sophist, rhetorician, etc., rather than the students themselves playing 
the part of the inner philosopher, so that the philosophical quest begins a dialogue between the 
archetypes that are models of how to live life.   3
freedom requires self-knowledge.   
How might students be encouraged to question their own previously 
unchallenged assumptions, as the ancient Greek philosophers did, about what is 
real, what is good, how to achieve what is good in their lives, and how all of this 
is known? This cannot be done unless the instructor is passionately engaged 
with questions such as whether or not we truly exist, why we exist in the way we 
do, what our place is in the world, whether or not we can escape the human 
condition of birth, sickness, injury, old age and death, etc.
5 If the instructor 
takes these questions seriously,
6 most students will naturally follow suit.
7 This 
is the best way to help students assimilate the insights of the Greeks, insights 
such as that we all have a natural desire to gain knowledge of ourselves and our 
world
8 and that the knowledge we desire primarily concerns questions about 
ourselves and our world the answers to which will show us how to live well.
9  
Only the instructor is in a position to bring to life the questions the Greek 
philosophers raised and the different answers they gave.
10  
Here I will illustrate just a few of the ways in which the instructor of a 
course in ancient Greek philosophy can make the course more relevant to how 
students live their lives. After explaining to them that the implicit goal of the 
course is to study Greek philosophy in order to learn how to use the logos to 
examine the mythos and to gain the wisdom that makes life meaningful, the 
instructor has them read Plato’s Apology. He or she explains the dialogue not 
only as a representation of a historical occurrence and/or as Plato’s rendition of 
Socrates’ defense of philosophical pursuits, but also as a warning about what 
                                                      
5 It may be doubted that the ancient Greeks, for instance, were concerned about escaping the human 
condition, etc., but this cannot be reasonably doubted in the case of Pythagoras, Empedocles, Plato, 
and Plotinus. It is even plausible, as I will suggest below, that this was part of Parmenides’ motivation 
for his journey to the goddess, who taught him that the sensible world is not real. 
6 It is indeed a problem for such a course to find an instructor of this sort, since most instructors of 
courses in ancient Greek philosophy have not themselves learned how to do this. They were trained as 
professional philosophers rather than as lovers of wisdom. 
7  It was the Greeks who taught us that learning is imitation. 
8 “All human beings by nature desire to know,” Aristotle tells us in the first sentence of the 
Metaphysics. His word for “to know” means to know the causes of things, especially the end for the 
sake of which beings change. 
9 “The good has been well described as that at which everything aims,” Aristotle says in the 
Nicomachean Ethics. 
10 Hence, what is said here about what the students need to learn also applies to the instructor. The 
dissemination of the Socratic pursuit of wisdom, as Plato knew, is by means of a transmission from 
those already inspired and trained. It cannot be learned simply by reading a book. Hence, it is 
important to begin a transmission by means of taking courses in ancient Greek philosophy taught in an 
impassioned matter. Most academic philosophy, unfortunately, is not concerned with such ideas.   4
might happen to the students’ own “inner Socrates” if they actually begin to 
question their own beliefs and values. Plato is interpreted as implying, in the 
Apology, that his readers, who are the students, are themselves Athens, and that 
there are citizens within their Athens who cling to the beliefs and values of 
Athens and are threatened by the activity of the inner philosopher. The Apology, 
in other words, is also taught as a simile for an inner life-and-death struggle that 
takes place between these invested parts of themselves and their inner 
philosopher, each appealing to the student, as Athens, to make a decision about 
whether to put the inner philosopher to death or to risk the death of Athens as the 
students know it by allowing him to continue his work. The inner philosopher 
and his opponents make their arguments and it is up to the students to decide 
whether or not to condemn him or allow him to question the ideas and values in 
which Athens believes. 
The point of presenting this allegorical interpretation of the Apology is to 
help students confront the fact that if they actually allow their inner philosophers 
to do his work in their own Athens there are others in their Athens who will 
attempt to have him put him to death by calling upon the fear that the Athens 
with which they are familiar may perish. Underlying this struggle is the fear 
students have about change, which is a symbolized by the fear of death. The 
threatened citizens, who uphold the conventional beliefs and values of Athens 
charge the inner Socrates with false beliefs and values (i.e. the atheism and 
sophism with which Socrates is charged), claim that he will destroy the city if 
not banished or put to death. The defenders of the status quo realize that the 
danger he poses is that the youth in Athens (i. e. the newly emerging part of 
Athens, the inner student, who may someday rule) are shown how to question 
the mythos that now governs the city and that if the mythos is overturned, the 
city as it now exists will perish.   
This interpretation, however, is not merely presented to students. The 
students themselves discuss the pros and cons of putting their own inner 
philosophers to death, thereby having them engage their different archetypical 
selves in a sort of role playing, unleashing fears and doubts the students have 
about seriously questioning their own beliefs and values and embarking upon a 
new way of life. The battle is about who will educate the youth of their city, the 
inner Socrates or those who champion the conventional beliefs and values that 
have governed the city for so long. At the end of the discussion, the instructor, 
speaking for the inner philosopher, makes a plea to the students not to put the   5
inner philosopher to death because they fear change and are attached to their 
unexamined values and beliefs.
11 Although the old Athens may not survive the 
questioning, the instructor argues, a new Athens may emerge as a new, more 
reflective and mature human being. He or she may add, as Socrates does in the 
Apology, that it is pointless, in any case, to put their inner philosopher to death 
now, since another inner philosopher will surely enter their city, calling its 
beliefs and values into question, if they continue with their present unreflective 
form of life,
12  which sooner or later crashes on the rocks of meaninglessness. 
Having set the stage in this impassioned way, the instructor uses the different 
philosophical works students study in the course to call attention to the 
philosophical questions pertinent to how we live our lives and to how the 
different Greek philosophers attempt to answer them. There are many examples 
of how to do this, and it is not possible to discuss them all here, in this short 
paper. For instance, the instructor might easily draw upon parts of Plato’s 
Phaedrus or Philebus, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Epictetus’ Manual, 
Epicurus’ letters, Plotinus’ Enneads, etc., to have them engage in deep reflection 
about how to live life in a meaningful way. But the relevance of the issues raised 
in such works is too obvious and uncontroversial for my purpose here, which is 
to show how even a part of ancient Greek philosophy believed to be unrelated to 
how to live a good life in the contemporary world is in fact related. So, instead, I 
will discuss the Greeks’ attempt to solve a metaphysical problem whose 
relevance to how we live our lives, as far as I know, has not been discussed in 
contemporary courses in ancient Greek philosophy. The full significance of this 
problem to the lives of students, however, can now be realized, since Western 
philosophy, like so many other things in this world, is being re-evaluated from a 
more global perspective. In this case, the new perspective has been made 
possible by the introduction into the West of Mādhyamika Buddhism.   
When the Chinese took over Tibet in 1959, the scholar monks of Tibetan 
Buddhism began to migrate to the West.
13 The practical significance of the 
problem to which I wish to call attention became clear to me when I began to 
study the Mādhyamika philosophy with these monks. My study, which involved 
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13  The story of the reception of Buddhism into the West has been told in several books on the subject. 
See, for instance, Rick Fields’ How the Swans Came to the Lake, Third Edition, Revised and Updated 
(Boston & London: Shambhala, 1992).   6
a study of the Indian philosophical traditions opposed by the Mādhyamikas, 
revealed that one of the central metaphysical problems with which the Greek 
philosophers were concerned is not of mere antiquarian interest, but is of great 
practical importance, and is also one of the central metaphysical problems with 
which Indian philosophy is concerned. It is the problem of whether or not the 
world of many changing things we experience is real in the way we assume it is, 
and if it is not, how it affects our decisions about how to live our lives. 
According to the Dalai Lama, who is now the leading exponent in the West 
of the Mādhyamika tradition of Buddhist thought, we all unnecessarily suffer 
because we misapprehend ourselves and everything else as real entities. It is 
possible, he says, to free ourselves from this misapprehension, and so to free 
ourselves from suffering, by realizing, in deep meditation, that no phenomena 
possess being by themselves, apart from being apprehended, apart from coming 
to be from causes and conditions, and apart from the phenomena in dependence 
upon which they are apprehended. That nothing we experience possesses being 
by itself, he cautions us, does not mean that nothing possesses any sort of being: 
it only means that nothing we experience possesses being in the independent 
way it appears to possess. According to the teachings of this form of Buddhist 
philosophy, when the mind apprehends its objects, it causes them to appear as if 
they possess being by themselves. Phenomena do possess being, the 
Mādhyamikas add, but only in dependence upon being conceived in relation to 
other things dependently conceived, and for this reason all phenomena are in 
fact mentally constructed. In this way, they claim, Mādhyamika Buddhism 
provides us with a middle way view that lies between reificationism, the view 
that phenomena possess real existence, and nihilism, the view that nothing exists 
at all. In dependence upon realizing in meditation the truth of this middle way 
view, they emphasize, we can assume a form of life that is a middle way 
between a self-destructive egoistic attachment to what we experience and the 
equally self-destructive rejection of our lives as meaningless. The Mādhyamika 
way to create lives that are constructive and meaningful is to take responsibility 
to work not only for our own liberation from suffering, but also for the liberation 
of all suffering beings, since our capacity to become free depends upon others 
with whom our lives are interdependent.
14  
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want here only to call attention to how its thesis, that we assume ourselves and our world, as they are 
ordinarily conceived, to exist in a way we do not and it does not, plays an important role in the history   7
The thesis of the Mādhyamika philosophy that is also taken up in ancient 
Greece is that sensible changing things do not possess the independent being 
they appear to us to possess. The suffering that arises from the mind’s misappre-
hension of sensible objects as real entities, i.e. as things in themselves, is 
explicitly called to our attention by the ancient Greek Skeptics, as has been 
noted in the literature,
15 and it is implicit in the world of Heraclitus, the 
Pythagoreans and Parmenides. So when in class the philosophy of the ancient 
Greek Skeptics is discussed, the full import for life of the mind’s 
misapprehension of sensible objects as real entities, i.e. as things in themselves, 
is made explicit. Because the instructor will stress that the Greek Skeptics are 
claiming that the students are causing themselves to suffer, he or she, for 
instance, (i) will present the ten modes of argument used by the Greek Skeptics 
to bring themselves to suspend their dogmatic judgments about what appears to 
them to be real entities as actual practices students themselves can use to relieve 
their suffering, and (ii) explain how, in spite of suspending judgment, they can, 
according to the Greek Skeptics, avoid nihilism by living in accord with 
appearances without assenting to their false appearance of being things in 
themselves.  
Nāgārjuna and the Greek Skeptics use many of the same arguments to 
support their thesis that what is conceived by the mind does not exist in the way 
it appears to exist. One of the most basic principles that underlies many of their 
arguments is that since objects, as apprehended by the mind, appear to it to 
possess being by themselves, they cannot change or be divided into parts that 
possess being by themselves, since what has being by itself cannot be caused to 
possess or lose its being and cannot be analyzed into real parts. The paper on 
which I am typing this sentence, for instance, is experienced by me as existing 
by itself, yet I also assume, inconsistently, that it changes and can be torn into 
pieces that also exist by themselves. We deal with the data of experience by 
creating concepts of things that cause the things conceived to appear to exist by 
themselves, and we assent to this appearance, and without reflecting on our 
assent to this appearance, blithely take for granted that the things so 
apprehended change and can possess real parts. We hide the fact of this 
                                                                                                                                                                      
of ancient Greek philosophy, I will ignore these other parts of this philosophy. 
15 One of the most recent and extensive accounts of the similarities between the Greek skeptical 
philosophy and the Mādhyamika philosophy can be found in Thomas McEvilley’s The Shape of 
Ancient Thought (New York: Allworth Press, 2002), pp. 450–90.   8
inconsistency by the supposition that the objects apprehended persist through 
change and are divisible into real parts by assuming that they inhere in an 
underlying subject, i.e. in what Aristotle calls matter or substratum, even though 
we do not, strictly speaking, perceive this matter when conceiving the object 
itself. 
But if the appearance of things existing by themselves is incompatible with 
their change and actual divisibility, should we abandon our judgment that they 
exist by themselves or should be abandon the judgment that they change and are 
divisible? Heraclitus, Parmenides, the Greek Skeptics and the Mādhyamikas 
believe that we should abandon our judgments that the objects of 
sense-perception possess real existence.
16  Although the Greek Skeptics were the 
first Greeks to make it perfectly clear that the way the mind apprehends its 
objects causes us to suffer, this view is implicit in the teachings of Heraclitus, to 
whom their idea, that it cannot be shown that anything sensed can possess a 
fixed nature of its own by virtue of which it has being, can be traced. By contrast, 
Parmenides believes that the incompatibility of true being with real change and 
real divisibility shows that an object apprehended by the mind does not really 
change and is not divisible into real parts. He assumes that an object of the mind 
does in fact possess true being and argues that its incompatibility with change 
and divisibility shows that our judgment, that it changes and that it is divisible 
into real parts, is false. Plato and Aristotle both attempt to solve these problem, 
but in radically different ways.   
Although in his poem, “On Nature,” Parmenides does not explain how his 
arguments against a being that changes and is divisible into real parts are 
relevant to how we are to live our lives, Diogenes Laertius’ report, that he 
studied with the Pythagoreans, provides a clue. If this report is correct, the 
upshot of his poem is likely to have been that the goddess who appears to him 
reveals how he may escape suffering and rebirth through knowledge of the true 
nature of all things. In relation to this purpose, Parmenides’ argument against the 
divisibility of being plays an important role in the development of Greek 
philosophy, giving rise to the infamous “problem of the one and the many,” 
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since it has great significance for how we live our lives. The monism he teaches, 
which is comparable to that taught in the Advaita Vedanta philosophy in India, 
has practical ramifications that the instructor can explain. However, because of 
considerations of the limits of this essay, I will not take up this aspect of 
Parmenides’ contribution to Greek philosophy, except to say that insofar as he 
claims that this knowledge is the knowledge that all things are one, he is one of 
the earliest of the Greek philosophers to introduce the major theme of the 
philosophies of Plato and Plotinus, that we are to escape rebirth in the body and 
realize our true godlike nature through a knowledge of the One.
17 
Here I will focus only on how the instructor can gloss Parmenides’ argument, 
that what possesses being by itself cannot change. He or she can present this 
argument in the context of the belief that we cause ourselves to suffer because 
we fail to realize that we misapprehend the world of many changing things as 
real. Parmenides’ argument will not be explained to students, therefore, as it 
normally is, as an abstract puzzle later philosophers attempt to solve. When it is 
explained how the Greek pluralists, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus 
made attempts to show that behind the world that appears to consist of changing 
beings there can be found a world of many unchanging beings whose 
combinations and separations create the false appearance of changing beings,
18 
they are attempting to provide a foundation for the belief that the world of sense, 
in spite of its changes, possesses a borrowed reality. In this way they sought to 
avoid the apparently nihilistic conclusion that the sensible changing world 
possesses no being at all. Their attempts to provide some reality for the sensible 
changing world, however, were crude and incomplete. It was left to Plato and 
Aristotle to provide subtler accounts of the appearance of the world containing 
changing beings. 
Plato agrees with Parmenides that since sensible things change, they cannot 
possess being by their own nature. In order to explain why we attribute being to 
sensible changing things he distinguishes things that change from the forms of 
                                                      
17 To Parmenides’ account of the One, however, Plato and Plotinus objected that the One itself 
transcends being. There are now a number of scholars who recognize that Parmenides and other early 
Greeks introduced a mystical tradition of this sort. See, for instance, the inspired account by Peter 
Kingsley, in Reality (Inverness, California: The Golden Sufi Center Publishing, 2003), and for a more 
academic treatment, see Thomas McEvilley’s The Shape of Ancient Thought, already mentioned in 
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18  They sidestepped Parmenides’ argument for the thesis, that being itself cannot be divided into many 
beings, by supposing that the world of experience arises not from one unchanging being, but from a 
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which they partake and which themselves possess being by their own natures. 
He says that things that change are not beings by their own natures, but only 
insofar as they partake of forms, which are the objects of the mind that do in fact 
posses being by their own natures. He claims that we apprehend changing things 
to possess being by themselves because we project the mind’s recollections of 
the forms onto the changing things that partake of them, thereby causing 
changing things to appear to us to possess being by themselves. The cognition in 
which a form is confused with a changing thing Plato calls “opinion” (doxa), 
which is by convention true if the changing thing partakes of the form and is by 
convention false if it only appears to partake of the form.
19 In the Phaedo he 
makes it clear that we suffer rebirth because we believe that the sensible world 
has being by itself, which belief seems to be supported by the physical pleasure 
and pain to which it gives rise.
20  The full implication of this view, as Plotinus 
makes abundantly clear, is that the root cause of our fall into the sensible 
changing world is not only the belief that the sensible changing world is reality, 
but also that we, as the sensible beings we ordinarily conceive ourselves to be, 
are real entities. They teach us that we are attached to our world and to our 
material self, even though we are, in fact, immaterial beings who belong to the 
world of the forms, from which place we in fact exercise our powers of moving 
matter in order to create moving images of the true reality. The Platonic path by 
which we escape the sensible changing world of suffering and realize our 
god-like nature is beautifully explained by Plotinus, who often urges his readers 
to follow this path.
21 
Aristotle argues that a being can in fact change because it is composed of 
both form and matter, since its matter persisting through its change and a new 
form is acquired or lost in the change. He claims that Parmenides mistakenly 
thought that a being cannot change because he lacked the conception of matter, 
which in union with form, the object of the mind, comprises a being that can 
change.
22 He acknowledges the truth of the claim that a form cannot change, 
                                                      
19 This is the account of opinion that explains Plato’s account s of it in the Republic, V (475d-480a), 
where true opinion is called opinion (doxa) and false opinion is called ignorance (agnoia), and his 
account in the Republic VI (509d-511e), where true opinion is called belief (pistis) and false opinion is 
called “imagination” (eikasia).   
20 See  the  Phaedo, 80c–84b. Compare Theaetetus, 176a–177b, and Phaedrus, 243e–257b.   
21  For instance, see Enneads, I.3, V.I. 
22 Aristotle learned of Parmenides’ error from Plato, who in the Sophist argued that the non-being 
Parmenides said could not be is otherness than a being to which reference is also being made rather than the 
absence of being. See J. Duerlinger’s Plato’s Sophist: A Translation with a Detailed Account of its Theses   11
and claims that even though this is so, the form exists in a matter that persists 
through the composite being’s change of form. The implication is that there is no 
reason to suppose, as Parmenides and Plato do, that there is an incompatibility 
between real being and change and that we cause ourselves to suffer by the 
supposition that the world of sensible changing things possesses being by itself. 
However, later in the course the instructor can draw upon the philosophies of 
the Greek Skeptics and Plotinus to challenge Aristotle’s “solution” to the 
problem. That problem, the Greek Skeptics and Plotinus agree, arises because 
the mind conceives its object as possessing being by itself, and what possesses 
being by itself cannot change. What Aristotle calls matter, as he himself admits, 
does not appear to the mind when the mind conceives a form. Hence, on what 
basis does Aristotle claim that he has solved the problem? He thinks that the 
existence of matter must be posited in order to explain how change is possible, 
and that it is obvious that change exists.
23 But when he says that it is obvious 
that change exists, what exactly does he think is obvious? Although it is obvious 
that change exists if it is assumed that the object of the mind is a form that exists 
in matter, it is not obvious that the form exists in matter. Aristotle has no 
argument for this assumption other than that it makes change possible; nor does 
he address the implied claim that we suffer because the mind apprehends 
sensible changing things as possessing being by themselves.   
There is, of course, much more to be said about this problem, whose upshot 
is that we cause ourselves to suffer by judging sensible changing objects to 
possess being by themselves. The instructor, of course, should also call attention 
to the circumstance, that since the Greek Skeptics do not accept Plato’s doctrines 
of the immortality of the soul and the separate world of forms, their conception 
of the goal of philosophy is radically different from that of Plato. They make its 
goal simply to live our lives free of the suffering caused by our dogmatic 
judgments. Such lives are possible, they argue, because we can follow the 
conventions of society without assenting, as others do, to the false appearance of 
mentally created objects that exist by themselves.   
At the end of the course the instructor, after telling this philosophical story 
and others, presents what he takes to be (i) the inner philosopher’s credo, which 
is that the unexamined life is not worth living, that philosophy is the pursuit of 
the wisdom that makes life worth living, and that this wisdom is the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and Arguments, second edition. (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2009). 
23 See  Physics, I.   12
self-knowledge that is the means to the achievement of the human good, and (ii) 
the lessons the study of Greek philosophy that are learned by the philosophical 
mind. The enumeration of the lessons learned varies according to the works of 
the Greeks the students happen to have studied in the course. The very last point 
the instructor makes, of course, is a warning to the students not to kill off their 
inner Socrates before he accomplishes his goal of transforming their Athens into 
a city that can flourish in the contemporary world, and to this end, they are 
encouraged to continue their study of ancient Greek philosophy. 
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